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INTRODUCTION
As IS WELL KNOWN, competitive equilibrium theory runs into difficulties when one considers the case of indivisible rather than divisible goods. However, recent studies have shown that for the special case where there is a single divisible good, usually thought of as money, and when each agent gets at most one indivisible good, the situation becomes tractable and in fact it exhibits structural features which are not present in the usual theory with divisible goods. For example, Quinzii (1984) shows that the core coincides with the set of competitive equilibria and in Demange and Gale (1985) it is shown that the set of equilibria have the structure of a lattice.
The present work continues the study of this model in the context of the problem of so called fair allocation. There has been an extensive literature dealing with this problem starting with the introduction of the no-envy concept by Foley (1967) and the general formulation of the problem by Varian (1974) . However, almost all of this work has treated the case of divisible goods (the exceptions will be noted in subsequent references). We here treat the discrete case.
Thus, a set of objects and an amount of money are to be distributed to a group of individuals in a manner which is (Pareto) efficient and envy free (everyone likes his own allocation at least as well as that of anyone else). This problem has been treated by Maskin (1982) for the case where all the objects are desirable and there are the same number of people as objects. He shows that if there is enough money, in a suitable sense, then such allocations will exist. We will here consider a somewhat more general model with particular emphasis on its structure (e.g. comparative statics) and especially the possibility of making (single valued) selections of especially desirable allocations from the point of view of justice from the set of all fair allocations. Briefly, here are some of the features of our presentation.
A. Generality
We allow any number of people and objects. Further, the objects may be undesirable, for example, tasks which must be performed, and the amounts of money may be negative as, for example, costs to be shared by the people. Indeed the most natural real life examples seem to be of these types. EXAMPLE I: A group of people, say the members of an academic department, are to be assigned various administrative tasks for which they are to be compensated from the department's fixed administrative budget. All members are assumed to be equally qualified for the jobs but they differ in the extent to which they like or dislike the jobs. Who should get which job and at what level of compensation? In this problem it is not unreasonable to consider the possibility of negative compensation to some of the people, the interpretation being that some of the department members are willing to pay others for doing the jobs they don't want to do themselves. EXAMPLE II: A group of students share a house for which they pay a fixed rent. The rooms are of various qualities, e.g. size, convenience, quietness, etc. The fraction of the rent paid by each student is to depend in a fair way on the room he gets. Here in order to get the fair allocation model we must assume the total amount of money to be divided, that is, the rent for the house, is negative. In this example it is also natural to impose additional constraints. For example, no student should have to pay more for a room than he thinks it is worth (an "individual rationality" condition) and/or no student should pay a negative rent which would mean being paid by the others to occupy a room. We will consider such additional constraints in Section 4.
B. Existence
Simple necessary and sufficient conditions are given for the existence of fair allocations. The notable feature here is that the existence proof, unlike those of almost all other equilibrium existence theorems, is elementary in the sense that it does not use fixed point theorems but obtains the desired allocation by solving a constrained optimization problem. The proof is in fact constructive and can be used to give an algorithm for finding a fair allocation (Alkan (1989) ). The only mathematical tool needed is the duality theorem for the optimal assignment problem which will be summarized briefly in Section 3. The main advantage to our proof, however, is that because of its constructive nature we are able to derive qualitative properties of fair allocations which do not seem to be obtainable by the usual fixed point methods (in fact it seems the fixed point methods will not work even for proving existence for the case when there are more objects than people) and we are able to show that the set of fair allocations has a strong connectedness property which is a nonlinear generalization of convexity.
C. Comparative Statics
The main result here shows that if there are at least as many people as objects and one has a fair allocation, then if the amount of money is increased, there is a new fair allocation which makes everyone strictly better off. Results of this sort typically fail to hold for the case of divisible goods. Even in the present case examples show that if there are more objects than people, thlen an increase in the supply of money may necessarily make one of the people worse off in any fair allocation.
Still on comparative statics, what happens if one adds new desirable objects? A simple example shows that this may make some of the people worse off. However, a surprising result shows that there is a unique fair allocation (later to be called the minmax money allocation) with the property that, if one adds just one new object, then there is a new fair allocation in which no one is made worse off.
D. Selection
The main results of this paper concern the relation of fair allocations and various notions of justice. In this connection it has been noted (see, e.g., Holcombe (1983) ) that using the word fair for efficient and envy free does not correspond to the everyday notion of fairness. To see how unfair a fair allocation can be, consider the case of two people and two objects, say an apple and an orange, and some money. Person A prefers the apple to all the money and values the orange at zero (by the value of an object to a person we mean the amount of money he would give for the object) while for person B it is the other way around. Then a possible fair allocation would give the apple and all of the money to A and only the orange to B. This arrangement seems unjust, and a more equitable procedure would be, for example, to divide the money equally. A second possibility would be to divide the money so that both people receive equal values. Thus if the apple is worth 10 to A and the orange is worth 8 to B and there are 6 units of money, perhaps A should get 2 and B should get 4. In general, egalitarian considerations suggest that a just allocation should divide either money or value "as equally as possible" subject of course to the requirement of fairness. The question is then to decide on the definition of "as equally as possible" and a pleasant and, to us, unexpected result is that if one adopts the Rawlsian criterion of achieving the greatest satisfaction for the least well off person, this selects a unique allocation from the set of fair allocations. The Rawls criterion is in fact just one of a collection of criteria with this uniqueness property. A second is what we have called the anti elitist criterion in which the richest person is to be made as poor as possible. As a third rather extreme example, the object may be to maximize the satisfaction of one particular person. Again it turns out that there is only one fair allocation (up to indifferent redistribution of objects) which will achieve this. Further, all of these criteria lead to selections with strong monotonicity properties meaning that when the amount of money is increased all people are made strictly better off.2
It is worth pointing out that none of the above nice properties of our fair allocation problem hold for the traditional case in which all goods are divisible (see, e.g., Moulin and Thomson (1988) ).
THE MODEL AND FAIR ALLOCATIONS
Let P be a set of m people with members A, B,... and let a be a set of n objects with members a,,B,/.... A bundle is a pair (a, x) consisting of an object a and x units of money. We will wish to consider bundles containing only money and no object, so for notational convenience we will introduce a null or worthless object denoted by 0. Thus, a bundle containing only money will be denoted by (0, x). Each A in 7 is assumed to have a preference ordering >-A on the set of bundles which is continuous and increasing in money. Thus The function kA should not be confused with utility functions which we do not use here. Value functions unlike utility functions are directly observable and are sometimes referred to as willingness to pay. It is convenient to reduce the general problem to one in which there are the same number of people as objects. This is easily done for the case m > n (objects are "scarce") by introducing m -n null objects (e.g., worthless pieces of paper). If m < n we introduce n -m fictitious people who value only money.
Thus if A is fictitious, then A(a, x) = x for all a. We denote real and fictitious people by PR An equivalent definition of strongly envy free which does not involve fictitious players is the following: a person not only prefers his bundle to that of anyone else but also prefers it to a bundle consisting of any unassigned object accompanied by y dollars where y is the maximum amount of money assigned to any person; thus y = max g x,(A). The reader should check that this is equivalent to the definition in terms of fictitious players. The notion of strongly envy-free is essential for the proof of existence in the case where there are more objects than people.
Suppose now the total amount of money is X. An allocation is called X-feasible if A strongly envy free feasible allocation will henceforth be called strongly fair. We remark that for the result above one needs the condition that the allocation is strongly envy free. As a simple example, suppose there is one person A and there are two objects a and /8 and A prefers (a, x) to (,/, x) for all x, but he prefers (,/, X) to (a, 0). Then allocating (,/, X) to A is envy free but clearly not efficient as it is dominated by giving him the bundle (a, X).
EXISTENCE OF FAIR ALLOCATIONS
As mentioned in the introduction the basic tool needed in our analysis is the duality theorem for the optimal assignment problem which we now recall. ) for all a, x, y, S. In words, separability means the marginal utility of money is independent of which object a person owns. In many situations this is quite an acceptable assumption. Thus in the student housing example the value of a dollar to a student probably does not depend on which room he occupies.
One easily sees that (12) is equivalent to assuming the value functions are given by PA(a, x) =CAa +x where CAa= 4(a, 0). The existence of envy-free allocations for this case now follows from optimal assignment duality since relation (10) is exactly (3), but also notice that these inequalities are invariant if a constant k is added to all xa. By adding a suitable k one can therefore satisfy EYDRX,(A) = X giving the desired fair allocation.
We will next prove the existence of fair allocations when the value functions are piecewise linear (i.e., the marginal utility of money is constant over a finite set of intervals). Since any continuous increasing function can be uniformly approximated by piecewise linear functions, the existence for the general case will then follow.
Let 4A denote the right-hand derivative of OA. Then piecewise linearity implies Q.E.D.
CONSTRAINTS
In the existence proof of the preceding section it was essential that the money vector x could have positive or negative entries. In the usual fair allocation problem one requires that all quantities be nonnegative. If we insist on nonnegative X, it is clear that envy-free allocations need not exist. For example, if there are m identical people and only one non-null object, then there must be at least enough money to compensate the people who don't get the object. Thus we must have X> (m -1)v where v is the value (to everyone) of the object. For the general case where X is required to be nonnegative, the requirement is (18 An allocation satisfying (19) will be called individually rational.
THEOREM 3: There exists an individually rational fair allocation provided X is sufficiently large so that It may also be natural to impose upper bounds on the xa. In the house-renting example, for instance, it would be unusual to have any student paying a negative rent. An upper bound on the xa requires an upper bound on X. In the house renting example the rent cannot be too low, for then again everyone might envy the person who gets the nicest room. An inequality like (20) with signs reversed is sufficient for existence in this case. We omit the details.
COMPARATIVE STATICS
The main result of this section is a strict monotonicity property of fair allocations. Namely, if v is strongly X-fair and Y> X, then there is a strongly Y-fair allocation which makes all people strictly better off. An example will show that the condition of strongness is needed. Namely there is an example with two people and three objects and an X-fair allocation such that if X is increased one of the people will be worse off in any new fair allocation.
We (ii) A E .9, a E0O U Y. Then A(a, Za) = A(a, Ya) < VA < UA since r is envy free. 3Proofs of Lemmas 3 and 4 are given in Demange and Gale (1985) and are included here to make the presentation self-contained. Theorem 4 shows that increasing the amount of money can make everyone strictly better off. One might hope that the same would be the case if one increased the number of desirable objects. The following simple example shows that this is not true. There are three people A, B, C and one object a, say an apple, which A and B value at 6, C values at 1, and X= 12. For efficiency the object must go to A or B so if A gets the object and x dollars then B and C must each get 6 + x dollars, so the solution is x = (0, 6, 6) and ui = (6, 6, 6). Now suppose there are two additional apples. Then everyone gets an apple and 4 dollars giving x = (4,4,4), u = (10, 10, 5), so C is worse off.
Note that in this example the phenomenon occurs when two additional objects are added. In Section 7 it will be shown that there is one particular allocation with the property that if a single new object is added there will always be a dominating fair assignment. Let X be the amount of money and let or assign A to a and B to P3. Then for any distribution of X the total value VA + VB will be X + 8. For X S 8 this total value can also be achieved by X which assigns A to y and B to a if and only if xa S 2 and x) S 6 as one sees by examining 4A(y, x) and B(a, x). It is also clear that no allocation can achieve total value greater than X + 8 and hence any efficient allocation must achieve this total value. From this and the preceding remark it follows that X cannot belong to any efficient allocation for X>8. 2, 0, 6) . Suppose now the money supply is increased by an arbitrarily small amount to 8+. Then from the above remarks any efficient allocation is of form (cr, -v, x) where x = (xa, xp, 0). We will show that VA drops from 8 to at most 7 , for since B must not envy A we must have kB(P, X)= 4 +x, = 4 + 8X-Xa =12-Xa >4B(aXa)> 7+Xa/2 or xa (10/3)+ 'and hence VAS 71 +. Thus we see that an arbitrarily small increase in X has produced a decrease in value of 2 for A. The example thus illustrates not only the failure of monotonicity but the possibility of sharp discontinuities of the set of fair allocations as a function of the supply of money.
One now verifies directly that (i-, -v, x) is an 8-fair allocation where -v = (8,8) and x = (

GEOMETRY OF THE FAIR SET
From the Monotonicity Theorem we now show that the money and value vectors of the set of fair allocations have a strong connectedness property which may be thought of as a nonlinear generalization of convexity. We say a vector x in Rn is between yj and z, if for every i either y, < x ;zi or zi Xi < Yi and x # y, x * z. A set S is a B-set if for any y # z in S there is an xc between y and z. A monotone path in Rn is a function f from (0,1) to Rn such that each fi is either nonincreasing or nondecreasing for i = 1,..., n. A set S is an M-set if for any x, y in S there is a monotone path from x to y.
Clearly, convex sets are M-sets. Also it is a fairly standard exercise to show that any closed B-set is an M-set (see, e.g., Alkan and Gale (1989) ). We now show the following theorem. It is conjectured that M-sets share many of the properties of convex sets, such as contractibility. However, this has been proved only in R2.
FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE
Except for degenerate situations there will always exist infinitely many fair allocations, so to choose among them one must introduce additional criteria. As mentioned in the introduction, the general philosophy is to divide things as equally as possible. This may be taken to mean either that money or value should be divided as equally as possible. In this section we consider only the case where there are the same number of (real) people as objects (though some of the objects may be fictitious).
For value vector u we write Urm minA =U and m aex E UA, and xr and XM are defined similarly. A fair allocation (-, From Theorem 4 there is an envy-free allocation Q' restricted to (9, ) with Xa -8 <xa <Xa and ua -8 <Wu <ua, and for 8 sufficiently small, (23) and (24) will still hold. Then combining W' on (6, e) with -V restricted to (0, ey) gives an envy-free allocation (because of (24)) with total money X' = E.x' < X. Applying Theorem 4 again gives an X-fair allocation X" with u" > ur contradicting that v( is Rawlsian.
Q.E.D.
EXTENDABILITY
In this section we again restrict ourselves to the case of an equal number people and objects. We say that a fair allocation v is universally extendable if whenever a new object is introduced there is a new fair allocation in which no one is made worse off. We show that among all fair allocations there is exactly one allocation which is universally extendable. It is the minmax money allocation, that is, the allocation which makes the richest person as poor as possible.
The result is sharp in the sense that for any other allocation it is possible to introduce a new object such that at least one person will be made strictly worse off under any fair allocation. We limit ourselves here to the case of separable preferences, as the argument in the general case is much more complicated (see Alkan (1990) ). We first show that any allocation which is not minmax money is not extendable. First note that the allocation which assigns to A1 the bundle (an+,1, 4) and assigns the other Ai by d* is strongly envy free, and the sum of the values of this allocation is E. lcii + 8 + X, so this must be the sum of the values for any fair allocation, but this can only be achieved by assigning A1 to a?n+1 since otherwise the sum of the values would not depend on e.
Terminology
We will show that w1 < v1, for if not then w1 = c11 + 8 +Yn+I > V1 > C11 +X1 (since v is envy free), so yn+1 >x -E>X* since E <x1 -4. Hence by feasibility for some i, say i = 2, y2 < X2*. Suppose 1(AK) = a 2. We will show that AK envies A1 because Wk = Ck2 + Y 2 < Ck2 + X2 < Ckk + Xk < Ckk + X1 < Ckk + Yn + 1, so ('-, jw3, y) is not envy free.
Q.E.D.
It remains to show that the minmax money allocation is universally extendable. We will need some terminology. We say that A likes a under allocation v if PA(a, Xa) = VA. 
